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BAR BRIEFS a
in all legislative bodies, the lawyer is mainly responsible for whatever
evil has grown into the system. But this growth is better understood
than is the lawyer-congressman's unwillingness or his inactivity in ex-
tricating legal procedure from cumbersome, involved and ineffective
rules. Fifty years ago the English courts were given the precise author-
ity that is now asked for the Federal courts, and the superiority of pro-
cedure in England over that in this country is now proverbial.-Kansas
City Star.
Attorney Paul W. Boehm, of Hettinger, replied to this article, and
we reprint here a part of that reply, to-wit:
This is only another manifestation of the popular sport of blaming
the lawyers for all the defects in our laws, and at the same time it dem-
onstrates how far astray a layman will go when he wanders in unfamil-
iar fields.
Is it true that the lawyers make the laws? Our legislatures are
composed of laymen by a very large majority. The sprinkling of law-
yers only partially succeeds in stemming the flood of ambiguous, con-
tradicting and often incomprehensible laws that are ground out in such
lavish profusion each year. Many of these laws are so clearly the work
of untrained minds (or should I say hands?) that even the editor of the
Kansas City Star will hesitate to attribute them to the lawyer members
of the legislatures. Their authors are evidently unfamiliar with the
laws on the books and so only create more confusion when they seek to
make changes. The result is as disastrous as when a lawyer attempts
to operate a farm or go into any business or profession for which he is
unprepared by previous study and experience.
Without laws and without practitioners thoroughly familiar with
laws, we should have to revert to the settlement of disputes by "Trial by
battle," or to the practice prevailing when fanatical mysticism ordained
that a man charged with a crime be tried by dipping his bare arms in
boiling lard and the innocent man could only escape conviction by a
miracle.
Only when all laws are passed on by experts in the law, before en-
actment, can the profession be blamed for the overwhelming number, the
conflicting and often incomprehensible nature, and the instances of mis-
carriage in our laws. When the American Bar Association raps on the
doors of our national legislature for nine years for the passage of laws
to simplify the Federal procedure, it is neither logic nor just to blame
the lawyers for the haphazard rules of procedure obtaining in the Fed-
eral courts.
REVIEW OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS
By C. L. YOUNG
McIntosh, Receiver, vs. Dakota Trust Company et al
A bank applied for fidelity bonds for its several officers and in the
separate applications certified that the officer for whom application was
made performed his duties in a satisfactory manner; that his accounts
were correct; that he was not in arrears; that he was en-
titled to confidence and was qualified to discharge his duties;
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that he was not indebted to the bank; and that proper ac-
counts would be kept and adequate examination of his transactions
made. The statements were false in every detail and were known so
to be by the officers making the applications, at the time they were
made. In reliance upon the statements the surety companies wrote the
bonds in question indemnifying against embezzlement, fraud, dishonesty,
theft, etc. The bonded officers were guilty of defalcations prior to the
date of the certificates and engaged in embezzlements on a large scale.
Suit was brought on the bonds by the receiver. HELD: That the bank
having taken part in procuring the bonds of the officers and employes
it was its duty to disclose any knowledge of past and existing defaults;
that authority of the officers of the bank to give the information con-
tained in the application may be inferred from their custom in that re-
gard covering a period of years; that the surety companies are entitled
to the benefit of that inference; that when concealments and misrepre-
sentations for which an employer is responsible are directly related to
the transaction to which the suretyship will attach and affect the liabil-
ity of the surety in material respects the sureties are released from the
bond; and that a banking corporation is liable to innocent third per-
sons where a representation is made in the course of its business by an
agent while acting within the scope of his authority though he is per-
petrating a fraud on the principal.
First National Bank of McVille vs. Gutru.
The owner of land leased the same under a written lease where-
by the lessee was to receive one-half the crop, but reserving title and
possession to all the crop in the lessor, and whereby the lessor agreed
to deliver to the lessee one-half the grain raised, or the proceeds there-
of, if sold, after deducting from any such share any just costs or dis-
bursements incurred by the lessor and any indebtedness owing from the
lessee to the lessor. The lessee gave a chattel mortgage on. one-half of
a threshing machine note and a coal account for the operation of the
threshing machine, and at maturity paid them. The amounts so paid
were deducted when settlement was made. The lessor did not know
of the mortgage until the claim of conversion was made. The transferee of
the chattel mortgage on the lessee's share of the crop sued the lessor in
conversion. HELD: That the advances made were made with the consent
of the lessee; that the items paid constitute an "indebtedness" within the
meaning of the lease; that the stipulation is valid as against the holder
of a mortgage; and that the owner is not guilty of conversion under the
facts.
Nelson vs. Wallrod et al.
One Nelson conveyed the land in controversy to his wife, who there-
after was adjudged insane and was committed to the hospital for the in-
sane. While on parole from the hospital the wife reconveyed the land
to her husband. At the time of conveyance she was under the husband's
guardianship and was not adjudged restored to sanity and capacity for
more than two years after the conveyance. Shortly after her adjudged
restoration she was again committed to the hospital as insane. Later the
husband obtained a divorce on the ground of incurable insanity, and
thereafter executed a mortgage on the land as a widower. Upon de-
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fault this mortgage was foreclosed and sold under a decree of foreclosure.
The former wife was made a party in the foreclosure proceedings by a
special guardian regularly appointed. The guardian filed an affidavit that
he had been advised by counsel that the former wife had no meritorious
defense, and therefore no defense was interposed. The judgment in fore-
closure decrees that the former wife's interest in the land is inferior and
junior to the lien of the mortgage. An action was brought on behalf of
the wife to set aside the conveyance to her husband, and to remove the
cloud of the foreclosure proceedings. HELD: That the action brought
was treated by the parties as an action to quiet title and is not a direct
proceeding to- vacate or set aside the judgment in foreclosure, and that
since such judgment determines the question of paramount title adversely
to the plaintiff, though its determination in that regard may be irregular
and ordinarily improper, such irregularity is not jurisdictional and the
foreclosure decree therefore is conclusive against collateral attack.
U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(From American Bar Ass'n. Journal)
A 20-pay life insurance policy issued in accordance with the provi-
sions of a term policy, which it replaces upon the mere application of the
insured, is governed by the law of the place where the original policy
was issued.-Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Dunken, Sup. Ct. Rep. 45-129.
The validity of a by-law of a fraternal benefit society is determined
by the law of the State of incorporation, and a member who joined in an-
other state is nevertheless bound by the by-law where the courts of the
State of incorporation have declared it valid.-Modern Woodmen vs. Mix-
er, Sup. Ct. Rep. 45-389.
The Harrison Narcotic Law is essentially a revenue measure; under
it a physician cannot be prosecuted for selling to an addict for self-ad-
ministration four small doses to relieve conditions incident to addiction.-
Linder vs. U. S., Sup. Ct. Rep. 45-446.
A statute requiring policies insuring against liability for injury by
operation of an automobile to contain a clause subrogating the injured
person to the rights of the insured in case the latter becomes bankrupt,
does not deny due process or effect an unlawful preference under the
Bankruptcy Act.-Merch. Mut. Auto Liability Ins. Co., Sup. Ct. Rep. 45.
Congress may constitutionally make it a crime to transport, receive,
conceal, store, barter, sell or dispose of, in interstate commerce, a motor
vehicle which is known to have been stolen.-Brooks vs. U. S., Sup. Ct.
Rep. 45.
The North Dakota Grain Grading Act by its necessary operation di-
rectly interferes with and burdens interstate commerce, and is therefore
invalid.-Shafer vs. Farmers' Grain Co. of Embden, Sup. Ct. Rep. 45-481.
